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From Gender Apartheid to Non-Sexism:
The Pursuit of Women's Rights in South Africa
Penelope E. Andrews*
I. Introduction
This article discusses the quest for women's rights in South
Africa and how the transition from apartheid to democracy led to a
commitment to gender equality as incorporated in South Africa's
transitional and final Constitutions.' In this endeavor, it refers to
the organizational attempts by women prior to and during the
constitutional drafting process to ensure that the new Constitution
embodied the aspirations and reflected the struggles for women's
rights by women activists in South Africa. This article is divided
into six sections. Section Two describes the legacy of apartheid for
all women in South Africa.' This investigation is appropriate
because the legacy of apartheid will bear significantly on the status
and lives of women for a long time. This section shows how the
laws and policies of apartheid were comprehensive, not only in
* Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. B.A., L.L.B.,
University of Natal; L.L.M., Columbia University. The author would like to thank the
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation for organizing
the symposium honoring the work of Professor Kenneth Broun. She would also like to
thank Dean Gene Nichol and the Faculty of the University of North Carolina School of
Law for their gracious hospitality. In addition, she would like to extend special thanks to
Sue Chang for secretarial assistance.
South Africa's constitutional negotiations involved a two-stage process. The first
stage was the negotiation process that preceded South Africa's first democratic elections
in May 1994, leading to the interim Constitution. For an account of the negotiations, see
generally The Small Miracle, South Africa's Negotiated Settlement, 7 S. AFR. REV. I
(1994) (analyzing race relations, the African National Congress (ANC), and politics and
governance in the period from 1989 to 1994, and making predictions for the years after
1994). The second stage was the writing of the final Constitution by a duly elected
Constitutional Assembly; this stage was completed in 1996 and certified by the
Constitutional Court that same year. For a detailed account of the constitution-making
process in South Africa, see generally HASSEN EBRAHIM, THE SOUL OF A NATION:
CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA (1998). This paper focuses only on the
provisions in the final Constitution.
I See infra notes 10-35 and accompanying text.
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enforcing rigid racial segregation, but also in racializing gender.'
Section Three focuses on the Constitution and outlines the myriad
of ways this document details comprehensive rights for women
both in the public and the private spheres.4 This section
demonstrates how the South African Constitution, in particular its
section on equality, has been described as one of the most
impressive human rights documents of the twentieth century
Specifically, the Constitution details rights expansively and
comprehensively, while its inclusion of sweeping rights for
women satisfies South Africa's international legal obligations.
Section Four of this article focuses on two cases regarding
women's rights decided by the Constitutional Court, arguing that
South Africa's evolving constitutional jurisprudence demonstrates
a deep commitment by the highest courts to eradicate odious
discrimination against women.6 Section Five analyzes the lobbying
efforts of women's organizations during the transitional period to
ensure that women's rights were incorporated into the new
Constitution.7 In addition, this section analyzes how these
lobbying efforts resulted in significant formal gains as reflected in
the Constitution This article concludes by assessing some of the
remaining obstacles to attaining women's equality despite the
significant advancements made thus far.9
II. The Legacy of Apartheid for Women
The system of apartheid existing in South Africa since 1948
and the previous periods of colonialism left all South African
women in a subordinated position.' This position of subordination
was determined in part by the racial status of women in South
3 See infra notes 10-35 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 36-67 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 36-67 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 68-182 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 183-202 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 183-202 and accompanying text.
I See discussion infra Section VI.
10 Fatima Meer, Women in the Apartheid Society, in THE STRUGGLE FOR
LIBERATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY 169, 173-81 (E.S. Reddy
ed., 1992).
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Africa's peculiar racial hierarchy." African women, who occupied
the lowest place in this hierarchy, were in the most disadvantaged
position. Indian and Coloured women fared only slightly better,
and white women, as members of the most favored racial group in
the apartheid racial hierarchy, were in the most advantageous
position.' 2 This did not mean, however, that white women escaped
the panoply of disadvantages and discrimination suffered by all
women in a patriarchal society like South Africa. In this respect,
Justice Albie Sachs of the Constitutional Court, one of South
Africa's most eminent legal jurists, has referred to patriarchy as
being "the only truly non-racial institution in South Africa."' 3
African women were left in a particularly bereft state; for them
apartheid meant separation from spouses, and for their children it
meant absent fathers. For African women apartheid also signified
the entrenched denial of a host of rights, including one of the most
fundamental of rights-the right to travel freely to seek gainful
employment.'4 The migrant labor system, also known as the
system of influx control, locked women into a spiral of
dispossession and disadvantage.' 5 This system, authorized by the
Black Urban Area Consolidation Act and a few other pieces of
legislation, operated to allocate rights to Africans in the most
pusillanimous manner.'6 The rights articulated in Section 10, the
1 The Population Registration Act of 1959, repealed in 1991, classified South
Africans into four broad racial groups, namely white, Coloured, Indian, and African,
with different sub-groups in each of the non-white categories. See generally Rene de
Villiers, Afrikaner Nationalism, in 2 THE OXFORD HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 365
(Monica Wilson & Leonard Thompson eds., 1971).
12 For a comprehensive discussion of the legacy of apartheid and the impact this
hierarchy had on women, see Penelope E. Andrews, The Stepchild of National
Liberation: Women and Rights in the Post-Apartheid South Africa, in THE POST-
APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH AFRICA'S BASIC LAW (Penelope E.
Andrews & Stephen Ellmann eds.) (forthcoming).
13 Albert Sachs, Judges and Gender: The Constitutional Rights of Women in a
Post-Apartheid South Africa, 7 AGENDA 1 (1990) (suggesting ways to overcome
structural inequality based on culture and laws).
"4 ALFRED MOLEAH, SOUTH AFRICA: COLONIALISM, APARTHEID AND AFRICAN
DISPOSSESSION 466-70 (1993). It has been pointed out that the economic marginalization
of black people in South Africa, created by the migrant labor system, has resulted in
African women bearing the brunt of such marginalization. id.
15 Id.
16 Black Urban Area Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 (repealed 1984).
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centerpiece of the legislation, provided extremely limited
conditions under which people could move or remain in the areas
designated as white." This denial of the freedom to move and to
obtain work locked women into a cycle of dependency in which
their livelihood depended on absent husbands and, sometimes, on
absent sons, who sent meager amounts earned in the city for the
upkeep of spouses, parents, and children.'8 This systematized
dependency, even at present, has the potential to thwart the
economic and social advancement of women for generations to
come.
This systematic separation of children from their fathers and
wives from their husbands created social and psychological
conditions which have yet to be explored in South Africa. The
Truth and Reconciliation Commission assessed the psychological
and physical trauma flowing from exposure to gross violations of
human rights.'9 The forced separation of families arguably
constituted a continuing violation of human rights, the
consequences of which deserve particular attention today. The
system of migrant labor rendered women, sometimes voluntary,
but often involuntary, parties to polygamous marriages." Men had
separate wives and families simultaneously in the cities and in the
rural areas.2' This situation created uncertainty and insecurity for
women and perpetuated the subordination of women, who were
seen as appendages of men, and, in fact, relied entirely on men for
their well-being." Moreover, because South African law did not
17 These issues are explored in comprehensive detail by Justice Moloto in this
volume. Judge Justice Moloto, South African Legal Reform After April 1994, 26 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 653 (2001).
18 Any visitor to the rural areas of South Africa during the apartheid years would
have been struck by the absence of young men. The rural areas housed the "superfluous"
people of South Africa: the old, the young, and the women. This absence of able-bodied
men reflected a rather Kafkaesque policy, the program of the apartheid government to
ensure "whiteness" in South Africa's urban areas. See INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE AND AID
FUND, APARTHEID: THE FACTS 17 (1983).
19 See 5 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 125-
69 (Susan de Villiers ed., 1998).
20 See generally Meer, supra note 10.
21 Id. Polygamy, which was allowed in customary legal regimes, pre-dated the
system of influx control. It is arguable, however, that the forced separation of women
and men encouraged multiple unions.
22 Id.
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recognize customary marriages, women in these unions were
denied legal protection, and their children were deemed
illegitimate.23
This system of dependency generated by apartheid law and
policy was reinforced by a traditional system of law and culture
that placed women under the perpetual tutelage of men.2" Under
traditional law and culture, women were denied a host of rights:
the right to own land, the right to custody of their children, and the
right to be chief or elected as chief.25 These laws and policies,
bolstered by an apartheid ideology that insisted on the second-
class status of women within African society, cemented their
inferior status; this legacy will continue to haunt women for many
generations.26
Coloured and Indian women were excluded from the migrant
labor system and allowed to move freely to secure employment
opportunities. 2 They also labored, however, under the apartheid
system's racial allocation of resources and the panoply of
disadvantages engendered by apartheid.28 Coloured and Indian
women continue to exist in abject conditions of poverty even
today. 9
In the private sphere, white women were subjected to highly
patriarchal and sexist attitudes within their own communities.
South Africa's particular brand of masculinity, bolstered by a
Calvinist religious ideology and a militarist white state, had a
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Penelope Andrews, Striking the Rock: Confronting Gender Equality in South
Africa, 3 MICH. J. RACE& L. 307, 323-27 (1998).
26 Martin Chanock, Law, State and Culture: Thinking About "Customary Law"
After Apartheid, 1991 ACTA JURIDICA 52, 64-70 (1991).
27 HILDA BERNSTEIN, FOR THEIR TRIUMPH AND THEIR TEARS: WOMEN IN
APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 11-13 (1985).
28 See CHERRYL WALKER, WOMEN AND RESISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 5-7 (1982).
29 See generally DON PINNOCK, THE BROTHERHOOD: STREET GANGS AND STATE
CONTROL IN CAPETOWN (1984). The Cape Flats, a large area outside of Capetown,
allocated specifically for residence of Coloured and African people, are the most
desolate and poverty-stricken areas of Capetown. Id. In addition, much of the Cape Flats
designated as Coloured is wracked by gang violence, disproportionate unemployment
rates compared to the rest of Capetown, horrendous statistics of crimes against women,
and lawlessness, all of which appear immutable. Id.
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particularly pernicious effect on white women, who were
conscripted into the maintenance of apartheid from which they
could benefit as non-whites, but not necessarily as women.3"
The system of racialized sexual subordination under apartheid,
and the violence to which women were subjected as a result, only
began to emerge as an issue of national concern during the dying
days of apartheid.3 This was so because during the apartheid
years, all women were considered second-class citizens.32 That
second-class status, however, was mediated by the apartheid
ideology that allowed status in the racial hierarchy to be
compromised by the sexist underpinnings of the whole society.33
One could argue that for white women, their subordinated status as
women was compensated by their status as the most favored group
in the racial hierarchy. The literature on women's status in South
Africa during the apartheid years focused largely on the status of
black women, specifically those of African descent.34 Scholarship
on the status of white women under apartheid was lacking. At the
dawn of South Africa's democracy, however, despite their
experiential contradictions, South African women converged
around the need to protect their interests as women."
III. The South African Constitution and Gender Equality
The South African Constitution reflects a clear commitment to
the principle of non-sexism and to the attainment of gender
equality. In the Founding Provision of Chapter 1, the Constitution
makes clear that the South African state is founded on several
values, including "[h]uman dignity, the achievement of equality
30 See generally JACKLYN COCK, MAIDS AND MADAMS: DOMESTIC WORKERS
UNDER APARTHEID (1989) (discussing the dissonance between white women and their
black female workers in the highly exploitative conditions of domestic labor).
31 See generally WALKER, supra note 28, at 5 (noting both the "sexual hierarchy
between male and female" and "the colour hierarchy of white over black").
32 Id. at 7. Under customary African law, "women were deemed perpetual minors,
always under the guardianship of their nearest male relative, regardless of their age." Id.
33 BERNSTEIN, supra note 27, at 28-30.
34 E.g., Meer, supra note 10. But see BERNSTEIN, supra note 27, at 82-83, 107-08
(documenting the involvement of white women in the struggles of black women); see
also WALKER, supra note 28 (tracing the relations between white women's suffrage
groups and the political and social struggles of black women's groups).
35 BERNSTEIN, supra note 27, at 88, 94-95.
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and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, [n]on-
racialism, and non-sexism."36 The most important provisions
relating to gender equality are found in the Bill of Rights,37
particularly Section 9, which outlines the preeminent principle of
equality." Section 9 contains a general commitment to equality
before the law and equal protection of the law, dictating that:
"[t]he state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender,
sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour,
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief,
culture, language and birth."39
Section 9 also provides that "[n]o person may unfairly
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more
grounds" as listed above."0 The language used in this equality
section is worth noting for several reasons. First, the prohibition
against discrimination on the several grounds listed suggests that
discrimination against women is just as constitutionally suspect as
discrimination on the basis of race. Thus, the South African
Constitution provides a firmer ground for women than that found
in American constitutional jurisprudence, which subjects sexual
discrimination to intermediate scrutiny and racial discrimination to
strict scrutiny.4' In other words, the South African Constitution
places sex or gender on the same footing as race for the purposes
of eliminating discrimination. Second, the "prohibition on direct
and indirect discrimination implicitly acknowledges the
invidiousness and tenacity of institutionalized discrimination." 2
This acknowledgment reflects thoughtful arguments by feminist
and other critical scholars about the need to include a clear
prohibition on indirect discrimination.4" Third, the inclusion of
36 S. AFR. CONST. ch. I, § I(a)(b).
37 Id. ch. II.
38 Id. ch. II, § 9.
39 Id. ch. II, § 9(3).
40 Id. ch. II, § 9(4).
41 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (noting that gender classifications
"must be substantially related to [the] achievement of those [governmental] objectives");
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (stating that the "most rigid
scrutiny" should be applied to racial classifications).
42 Andrews, supra note 25, at 328.
43 See, e.g., Margaret Thornton, The Indirection of Sex Discrimination, 12 U.
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both sex and gender as grounds for proscribing discrimination has
the potential of protecting women from invidious discrimination
based not only on biological or physical attributes, but also on
social or cultural stereotypes about the perceived role and status of
women. Section 37 of the Constitution, however, permits
emergency derogation from the constitutional protection of
equality with respect to gender, though not sex, and reflects a
certain reticence on the part of the constitutional drafters to upset
prevailing stereotypes about the role and status of women."
Fourth, in Section 9 the Constitution prohibits discrimination by
private individuals and obliges the government to enact legislation
"to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination."45 Finally, the
equality section also provides that discrimination on the grounds
listed "is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is
fair."46
Of enormous potential value to women is the inclusion of
protective measures, or affirmative action. Section 9 of the
Constitution provides that "[e]quality includes the full and equal
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement
of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or
advance persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair
discrimination, may be taken."'" It is patently "clear that a
constitutional mandate for affirmative action is an important
weapon for tackling structural discrimination in a comprehensive
manner, as well as shielding affirmative action programs from
constitutional challenges."4 This incorporation of affirmative
action in the Constitution parallels South Africa's commitment to
gender equality as reflected by the government's ratification of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW).49 CEDAW provides that "[a]doption
TASMANIA L. REV. 88, 91-92 (1993).
44 S. AFR. CONST. ch. II, § 37. Derogation from the constitutional protection of
equality is not allowed "with respect to unfair discrimination solely on the grounds of
race, colour, ethnic or social origin, sex, religion or language." Id.
45 Id. ch. II, § 9(4).
46 Id. ch. II, § 9(5).
47 Id. ch. I1, § 9(2).
48 Andrews, supra note 25, at 329.
49 G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc.
A/34/830, A/34/L.61 (1979).
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by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at
accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not
be considered discrimination. . . . [T]hese measures shall be
discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and
treatment have been achieved."5
The Constitution also provides that "[e]veryone has inherent
dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and
protected."5  This provision has enormous potential for the
protection of women. One could plausibly argue that violence
against women in its many forms is clearly a violation of women's
dignity, and that the state's failure to take steps to prevent violence
against women is in contravention of the Constitution. With
respect to the right of women to be free from violence, the
Constitution provides that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom
and security of the person which includes the right ... [t]o be free
from all forms of violence from either public or private sources."52
This significant advancement has enormous potential to
protect women from violence both within the home as well as
outside the home. It is now recognized that women are more likely
to be subjected to violence from loved ones within the family than
from strangers. 3 This provision also coheres with feminist
agitation about the persistence of the public/private divide in law,
and its deleterious impact on women. Feminist scholars have
long argued that the public/private distinction discriminates
against women and perpetuates violence against them.5
The goals of non-sexism are also found in other sections of the
Bill of Rights. Section 12, for example, provides that: "Everyone
has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes
the right (a) to make decisions concerning reproduction; (b) to
security in and control over their body; and (c) not to be subjected
50 Id. pt. 1, art. 4(1).
I' S. AFR. CONST. ch. II, § 10.
52 Id. ch. II, § 12(1)(c).
11 Rhonda Copelon, Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture,
in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 116, 120
(Rebecca J.Cook ed., 1994).
14 See Celina Romany, State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of
the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 53, at 85.
55 See id.
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to medical or scientific experiment without their informed
consent. 5 6 These provisions have enormous potential to protect
women with regard to personal choices about birth control and
reproduction. The Constitution also protects freedom of
expression, but only insofar as it does not involve "advocacy of
hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that
constitutes incitement to cause harm.'
57
With respect to the enforcement of the rights listed in the Bill
of Rights, the Constitution comprehensively defines those who
have legal standing to sue and also lays the basis for class action
litigation." This section states that any person listed in the Bill of
Rights "has the right to approach a competent court" to seek relief
when "a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or
threatened. '59 The Bill of Rights also provides that relief may be
sought by:
(a) anyone acting in their own interest;
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in
their own name;
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group
or class of persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.6°
In addition to the provision of substantive rights, the
Constitution attempts to ensure that the courts and other tribunals
and forums interpret the rights in the Constitution in a way that
comports with the Constitution's underlying ideals. The
Constitution specifically states that "when interpreting any
legislation and when developing the common law or customary
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights."6' In addition, courts are
also required "to consider international law and may consider
56 S. AFR. CONST. ch. 1I, § 12(a).
57 Id. ch. II, § 16(2)(c).
58 Id. ch. fI, § 38.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. ch. II, § 39(2).
[Vol. 26
FROM GENDER APARTHEID TO NON-SEXISM
foreign law" when interpreting the Bill of Rights.62  The
Constitution also acknowledges rights or freedoms incorporated in
legislation, in common law, or in customary law; however, these
rights may not contradict the values inherent in the Constitution.63
To abet the enforcement of women's rights in the Constitution and
in pursuit of the goal of non-sexism, the Constitution provides for
a Commission for Gender Equality to promote, educate, monitor,
and lobby for gender equality.' The functions of the Commission
for Gender Equality are set out clearly in Section 187, which
provides that:
(1) The Commission for Gender Equality must promote respect
for gender equality and the protection, development and
attainment of gender equality.
(2) The Commission for Gender Equality has the power, as
regulated by national legislation, necessary to perform its
functions, including the power to monitor, investigate, research,
educate, lobby, advise, and report on issues concerning gender
equality.
(3) The Commission for Gender Equality has the additional
powers and functions prescribed by national legislation.
The Constitution also provides for the establishment of the Human
Rights Commission to promote and protect human rights.66 In
addition, the Constitution provides for a Public Protector "to
investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public ... [sector
that is] suspected to be improper or to result in any impropriety or
62 Id. ch. II, § 39(1). These issues are explored in detail by Catherine Admay in this
volume. Catherine Adcock Admay, Constitutional Comity: Mediating the Rule of Law
Divide, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 723 (2001).
63 S. AFR. CONST. ch. II, § 39(3).
64 Id. ch. XI, § 187.
65 Id. ch. XI, § 187(1)-(3).
66 Id. ch. XI, § 184. In Section 184, the Constitution provides the following
functions for the Human Rights Commission: "(a) [to] promote respect for human rights
and a culture of human rights; (b) [to] promote the protection, development and
attainment of human rights; and (c) [to] monitor and assess the observance of human
rights in the Republic." Id. Most importantly, the Constitution provides that "[e]ach year,
the Human Rights Commission must require relevant organs of state to provide the
Commission with information on the measures that they have taken towards the
realisation of the rights in the Bill of Rights concerning housing, health care, food, water,
social security, education and the environment." Id. ch. XI, § 184(3).
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prejudice" and "to take appropriate remedial action. 67
The mandate of these commissions and the Constitutional
Court indicates that the Constitution has not only provided for
substantive rights, but also for efficient enforcement mechanisms
which are required to enforce the spirit of the Constitution in its
deliberations. The effective functioning of these commissions as
well as the courts, of course, is always predicated on state
resources and on the state's commitment to continued vigilance of
women's rights.
IV. An Evolving Constitutional Jurisprudence
The evolving constitutional jurisprudence emanating from the
Constitutional Court suggests a clear break from South Africa's
ignominious legal past to one forged on principles of equality and
non-discrimination. The two cases discussed below demonstrate a
thoughtful articulation by the Court of the need to eradicate the
vestiges of discrimination against women.68
In 1996 the Constitutional Court considered the
constitutionality of an executive order signed by President Nelson
Mandela, that sought to pardon "all mothers in prison on 10 May
1994, with minor children under the age of [twelve] 12 years. 69
This section of the Presidential Act was challenged by a male
prisoner who argued that the remission of sentences applicable
only to mothers violated the constitutional rights of fathers."0 The
basis of his challenge was that the provision in question unfairly
discriminated against him on the grounds of sex or gender, and
indirectly against his son because the latter's incarcerated parent
was not female.7' The lower court agreed with the complainant and
found that the Presidential Act discriminated against him on the
grounds of sex and gender. 2 The court also found that the
presumption of unfairness had not been rebutted by the President.73
67 Id. ch. XI, § 182(i)(a), (c).
68 See infra notes 69-182 and accompanying text.
69 Hugo v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. & Another, 1996 (4) SALR 1012,
1016 (CC).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1012.
72 Id. at 1016.
73 Id.
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After hearing the case on appeal, the Constitutional Court reversed
the lower court's decision." In a lengthy deliberation, the Court
first considered the nature of the power granted to the President
under the Interim Constitution to pardon individuals or groups."
The Court concluded that the presidential power to pardon is
guided by the principle of equality as articulated in the
Constitution, even though its origins lie in the royal prerogative."6
The Court undertook a comprehensive journey through
comparative jurisdictions that have addressed the question of
judicial review of presidential pardons and concluded that the
President's decision to grant the pardon to women and not men
was done in the best interests of the child."
Justice Goldstone, writing for the majority, first found that the
presidential pardon discriminated against the complainant."
Addressing the presumption of unfairness that is triggered by the
discrimination, the Court evaluated the rationale underlying the
Presidential Act in allowing the special remission for mothers of
minor children.79 The Court referenced the special testimony of the
Director of the South African National Council for Child and
Family Welfare on the peculiar role that mothers play in the
rearing of their children. 0 The Court noted the apparent
contradiction between the reality that mothers bear the greatest
74 Id. at 1017.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1020.
77 President of the Republic of S. Afr. & Another v. Hugo, 1997 (4) SALR 1, 11-25
(CC).
78 Id. at 19.
79 Id. at 20.
80 Id. at 21. In her affidavit, the Director stated:
In my opinion, the identification of this special category for remission of
sentence is rationally and reasonably explicable as being in the best interests of
the children concerned. It is generally accepted that children bond with their
mothers at a very early age and that mothers are the primary nurturers and care
givers of young children. In my experience, there are only a minority of fathers
who are actively involved in nurturing and caring for their children, particularly
their pre-adolescent children. There are, of course, exceptions to this
generalization, but the defacto situation in South Africa today is that mothers
are the major custodians and the primary nurturers and care givers of our
nation's children.
Id. at 21.
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burden of childrearing and the constitutional imperative that
everyone be treated equally." The Court acknowledged, however,
the contemporary situation in South Africa in which mothers have
the greater share of childrearingi2 Distinguishing between the
idealized situation in which fathers and mothers equally share
childrearing functions, and the generalized situation of unequal
childrearing, the Court found that children would substantially
benefit from the Presidential Act."3
The Court acknowledged that the generalization about women
bearing the greater proportion of the burden of childrearing has
historically been used to justify the unequal treatment of women.84
In this respect, reference was made to an earlier court decision in
South Africa in which women were denied entry to the legal
profession in part because of their childrearing responsibilities.85
The Court, however, distinguished between the burden flowing
from the generalization as opposed to an opportunity such a
generalization may spur. 6
The Constitutional Court considered the likely outcome if
equal treatment were applied and concluded that no public benefit
would be gained by releasing fathers because they were not the
primary caretakers of children. 7 Pointing out that the Presidential
Act provides for individual application for remission of sentences
by male prisoners where special circumstances can be shown, the
Court therefore found the discrimination to be fair.88
81 Id. at 22.
82 Id. at 21.
83 Id. at 25.
84 Id. at 22.
85 Id. (citing Inc. Law Soc'y v. Wookey, 1912 A.D. 523).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 25. The Court also referred to the large numbers of male prisoners as
opposed to female prisoners, and to the public outcry that may ensue if large numbers of
male prisoners were to be released in light of the alarming levels of crime. Id.
88 Id. at 26. Justice Didcott dissented in the judgment, basing his opinion on a
previous Constitutional Court case which held that when no benefit or advantage can be
derived from a declaration from the Constitutional Court, that declaration becomes
"wholly academic ... exciting no interest but an historical one." Id. at 30 (Didcott, J.,
dissenting) (citing J.R. Publ'g (Pty.) Ltd. & Another v. Minister of Safety and Sec. &
Others, 1997 (3) SALR 514 (CC)). Justice Didcott believed that because of the
absolutely unique nature of the presidential decree, "its repetition on any similarly
auspicious occasion which may arise some day seems improbable." Id. at 30 (Didcott, J.,
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Justice Kriegler's dissent is worth noting because it appears to
comport with current American equal opportunity jurisprudence. 9
He agreed with the Court's conclusion that the power of
presidential pardon granted under the clemency powers of the
South African Constitution is subject to judicial review for
consistency with the equality section of the Constitution." He also
agreed that the court below made an error in requiring that this be
corrected because it violated the Constitution.' He disagreed,
however, with the Court's conclusion that the clemency granted
for mothers of young children was fair.92 In his opinion, the
presidential pardon did not pass constitutional muster. 3 Like the
majority, he found that the President violated the equality
provisions of the Constitution by distinguishing between classes of
parents on the basis of their gender, but, unlike the majority, he
concluded that the presumption of unfairness in "attaching that
distinction has not been rebutted."94 Justice Kriegler questioned
one of the assumptions of the presidential decree that had not been
fully explored, namely, that large numbers of men being released
from prison would shake public confidence.95 He questioned the
absence of empirical data to support this proposition, noting that
the majority had instead relied on public perceptions about crime. "6
Justice Kriegler insisted that where some rebuttal is provided
for the presumption of unfairness, such rebuttal must be
scrutinized thoroughly and must not be "discharged with relative
ease."97 He took issue with the rationale that women were the
primary caregivers of young children, stating this generalization to
dissenting). He pointed out that the decree was time-specific and was certainly not
designed to continue indefinitely. Moreover, the decree would not benefit the father
whose child was not under the age of twelve; by the time the matter came to Court, the
child had already celebrated his thirteenth birthday. This rendered the matter moot. Id. at
29 (Didcott, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 31 (Kriegler, J., dissenting).
90 Id. (Kriegler, J., dissenting).
9' Id. (Kriegler, J., dissenting).
92 Id. (Kriegler, J., dissenting).
93 Id. (Kriegler, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 32 (Kriegler, J., dissenting).
9- Id. at 34 (Kriegler, J., dissenting).
96 Id. (Kriegler, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 35 (Kriegler, J., dissenting).
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be "a root cause of women's inequality in our society. It is both a
result and a cause of prejudice: a societal attitude which relegates
women to a subservient, occupationally inferior yet unceasingly
onerous role. It is a relic and feature of the patriarchy which the
Constitution so vehemently condemns."98  Justice Kriegler
concluded that a small number of women would benefit from this
pardon, but the rebuttal and the rationale for the rebuttal used by
the majority would operate as a "detriment to all South African
women who must continue to labor under the social view that their
place is in the home."99 The benefit to a few hundred women
cannot justify the continued stereotyping of women as the primary
caregivers. "'
Justice O'Regan's concurring opinion is also particularly
noteworthy."' She agreed with the statements made by the
majority about the reviewability of the presidential pardon and
focused her comments entirely on the question of whether the
discrimination inherent in the presidential order was unfair.'2 She
found Justice Kriegler's approach too restrictive, instead noting
that the determination of whether the discrimination was unfair
required a recognition that "although the long-term goal of our
constitutional order is equal treatment, insisting upon equal
treatment in circumstances of established inequality may well
result in the entrenchment of that inequality."'' 3 She noted that
98 Id. at 37 (Kriegler, J., dissenting). Justice Kriegler also made an important point
that nowhere in the presidential decree was it mentioned that the purpose of the decree
was to benefit women, because childless women were not included in the decree. Id.
(Kriegler, J., dissenting). The purpose was not to make good past discrimination against
women; the purpose of the decree was to benefit children. Id. at 37-38 (Kriegler, J.,
dissenting).
99 Id. at 38 (Kriegler, J., dissenting). He also pointed out that this would have the
effect of men internalizing the notion that they have a secondary role in caring for their
children. Id. (Kriegler, J., dissenting).
Ioo Id. (Kriegler, J., dissenting).
"0' Id. at 40-47 (O'Regan, J., concurring). Justice Mokgoro's concurring opinion
noted specifically that the question before the court was whether, under the Presidential
decree, only women should be released or no one released. Id. (Mokgoro, J., concurring).
In addition, he noted that, taking everything into account, particularly the enormous
benefit to the children to be united with their parent, the limitation in Section 33(1) of the
Constitution can be justified by the Presidential decree. Id. (Mokgoro, J., concurring).
102 Id. at 47 (O'Regan, J., concurring).
"03 Id. at 49 (O'Regan, J., concurring).
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there were two factors relevant to the determination of unfairness:
an analysis of the group that has suffered discrimination, and the
"effect of the discrimination on the interests of those concerned.""M
She evaluated the vulnerability of the group affected by the
discrimination and the particularly invasive nature of the
discrimination. 5 Justice O'Regan noted that even though the goal
of equality in the Constitution is very clear, the factual reality in
South Africa was that women did carry, and would continue to
carry in the foreseeable future, the greater burden of
childrearing.' 6 She considered this a crucial fact in looking at
discrimination and determining the unfairness of the distinction
made.' °7 Referring to Justice Kriegler's proposition that there
would be a profound disadvantage for women in perpetuating the
stereotype through the distinction, Justice O'Regan pointed out
that the profound disadvantage did not result from the presidential
decree but from the inequality which was part of the social fabric
of South African society.' 8 She disagreed with Justice Kriegler
that this presidential pardon harmed women. '09 She also pointed
out that any discrimination that men may suffer as a result of the
presidential pardon was not severe."0 Even though fathers were
denied the special remission of sentence by the general decree,
they did have the opportunity to make individual applications."'
The majority and concurring opinions in this judgment indicate
the broad contours of equality that the Constitutional Court is
prepared to embrace. The Court is concerned not just with formal
equality (equal treatment), which can at times lead to inequality,
but also with substantive equality, which contextualizes the actual
experiences and reality of women within the formal impediments
to equality." 2
'04 Id. (O'Regan, J., concurring).
i Id. (O'Regan, J., concurring).
106 Id. (O'Regan, J., concurring).
107 Id. (O'Regan, J., concurring).
108 Id. (O'Regan, J., concurring).
109 Id. (O'Regan, J., concurring).
"o Id. at 50 (O'Regan, J., concurring).
"I Id. (O'Regan, J., concurring).
"2 See generally Diana Majury, Strategizing in Equality, 3 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 169
(1987) (comparing the "equal treatment" type of equality requiring complete gender-
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In S. v. Baloyi,"3 the Constitutional Court considered the
constitutionality of Section 3(5) of the Prevention of Family
Violence Act 133 of 1993 (the Act)." 4 The subsection had been
declared invalid by the Transvaal High Court, which had referred
its finding to the Constitutional Court for confirmation."5 The High
Court's declaration of invalidity was based on its finding that the
subsection under review "place[d] a reverse onus of proving
absence of guilt on a person charged with breach of a family
violence interdict,""' 6 thus conflicting with the constitutionally
protected presumption of innocence without compelling
constitutional justification."7 The case presented the opportunity
for the Constitutional Court to confront the vexing issue of
domestic violence and to balance the need to eradicate domestic
violence against the constitutional rights of accused persons to a
fair trial."8
The Minister of Justice and the Commission for Gender
Equality intervened in the action, challenging the High Court's
decision on three grounds." 9 First, they felt the "alleged violators
should not be considered 'accused persons' entitled to the
presumption of innocence.""'2 Second, even if they were to be
treated as such, the sections of the Criminal Procedure Act under
review should not be interpreted as imposing a reverse onus. '
Third, if the proper interpretation of those sections involved the
imposition of a reverse onus, "then the limitation of the
presumption of innocence involved could be justified."' 2
neutral treatment of women with a different type of equality that affirmatively recognizes
inherent differences between men and women).
"13 2000 (2) SALR 425, 427 (CC).
114 Id.
"15 Id. Although the Prevention of Family Violence Act was soon to be replaced by
the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998, the Constitutional Court believed it appropriate
to deal with the sections under review because they would soon affect appellant and
others similarly situated. Id. at 428.
116 Id. at 427-28.
''7 Id. at 428.
118 Id.
"19 Id. at 430.
120 Id. at 431.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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The complainant, the wife of an army officer, had been granted
an interdict against her husband by a magistrate in Pretoria.'23 The
appellant was ordered not to assault either the complainant or their
child and not to prevent them from entering or leaving the marital
home. 24 The appellant ignored the interdict and subsequently
assaulted and threatened to kill the complainant.'25 She complained
to the police, and after she signed an affidavit, the police arrested
the appellant and brought him before a magistrate to inquire into
the alleged breach of the interdict.'26
The Court began its discussion by addressing the
Constitution's express reference to the problem of domestic
violence.'" Justice Sachs, writing for the majority in a unanimous
decision, embarked on a thoughtful analysis of the need to deal
comprehensively and effectively with the problem of domestic
violence.' 2' He described the unique "hidden, repetitive character"
of domestic violence, its ubiquity in cutting across class, race,
culture, and geographic boundaries, and the deleterious
consequences of its persistence for society.'29 Moreover, because
of the gender-specific nature of domestic violence, it mirrored and
mimicked patriarchal domination in a particularly abhorrent
manner. 130
Justice Sachs explored the banality and perceived inevitability
of domestic violence and the imperatives on the government to
stem it.'3' He contextualized the problem as embedded in
patriarchy and the continued subordination of women.'32 In their
research, women's organizations have uncovered "high levels of
domestic abuse across all sectors of South African society.' 33
123 Id. at 428.
124 Id. at 428-29.
125 Id. at 429.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 432.
128 id. at 431-33.
129 Id. at 431.
130 Id. at 432.
131 Id. at 431-33.
132 Id. at 432.
'33 Penelope E. Andrews, Violence Against Women in South Africa: The Role of
Culture and the Limitations of the Law, 8 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 425, 445
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These disturbing numbers confirm the Court's assessment of the
"certain normalcy or banality" of domestic violence. '34 In his
analysis, Justice Sachs detailed the effects of domestic violence on
its victims.' 5 Moreover, he noted that the collusion of the state in
failing to eliminate domestic violence undermined the state's
promise of gender equality and non-discrimination so clearly
articulated in the Constitution.' 36 Such inaction on the part of the
government also contradicted South Africa's international and
regional obligations, including those contained in the General
Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women,'37 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women,'38 and the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights.'39
Dealing with the constitutional presumption of innocence,'
40
Justice Sachs cited a list of Constitutional Court decisions that
reiterated this right. 4 ' He then elaborated on the hybrid
(public/private) nature of the Act and analyzed the complications
that surface when the private (family) domain intersects with the
public through the interdict provisions.' 42 The interdict proceedings
in the Act are situated somewhere between family and criminal
law remedies; their purpose is to supplement and enforce those
(1999).
134 Id. at 446.
'31 Baloyi, 2000 (2) SALR at 431-33.
136 Id. at 431-33 n.22. Of particular relevance to domestic violence is the right in
Section 12(1) of the 1996 Constitution: "Everyone has the right to freedom and security
of the person, which includes the right ... to be free from all forms of violence from
either public or private sources." S. AFR. CONST. ch. II, § 12(l)(c) (emphasis added).
137 G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc.
A/48/629 (1993).
138 G.A. Res. 34/180, supra note 49, at 193.
'39 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). "The Charter was signed by South Africa in 1995 and
ratified in 1996." Baloyi, 2000 (2) SALR at 434 n.30.
140 Section 35(3) of the 1996 Constitution provides: "Every accused person has a
right to a fair trial, which includes the right.., to be presumed innocent, to remain silent,
and not to testify during the proceedings .... S. AFR. CONST. ch. II, § 35(3)(h).
141 Baloyi, 2000 (2) SALR at 435 (citing Osman & Another v. Att'y-Gen.,
Transvaal, 1998 (4) SALR 1224 (CC); Pharbhoo & Others v. Getz NO & Another 1997
(4) SALR 1095 (CC); S. v. Coetzee & Others 1997 (3) SALR 527 (CC); S. v. Prinsloo
1996 (2) SALR 464 (CC); S. v. Gwadiso 1996 (1) SALR 388 (CC)).
142 Id. at 435-38.
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remedies. 3
Citing feminist scholarship on this issue, Justice Sachs stressed
the unique character of domestic violence as a legal problem
because of the "strange alchemy of violence within intimacy.'"4
Innovative legal skills and methods are therefore essential in
combating the problem; to some extent, the interdict provisions of
the Act create the legal space for such a possibility.15 These
provisions require that police officers and other actors in the legal
system temporarily jettison often negative attitudes about the
appropriateness of interfering in private family matters.' 46 In a
country where victims of domestic violence have largely
experienced the policy as ambivalent to their predicament, these
provisions are imperative if the attitudinal shift in policing
domestic violence is to occur.'47 The interdict provisions are
intended as an "accessible, speedy, simple and effective"
process.4 It is a proactive mechanism aimed at preventing further
violence without being punitive.' 41 In the words of Justice Sachs,
"it seeks preventive rather than retributive justice."5 °
Justice Sachs then went on to deal with the three grounds on
which the Act was challenged.'5 ' The first was whether the alleged
violator was "an accused person" and therefore entitled to the
presumption of innocence. '52 Counsel had argued on the basis of
Nel v. Le Roux No and Others'53 that the proceedings under the Act
were "essentially civil in character" and that "the arrested person
was not an accused person entitled to the protection of section
143 Id. at 437-38.
'44 Id. at 436 (citing Joanne Fedler, Lawyering Domestic Violence Through the
Prevention of Family Violence Act 1993-An Evaluation After a Year in Operation, 12 S.
AFR. L.J. 231, 243 (1995)).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
'51 Id. at 438-44.
1 Id. at 438.
153 1996 (3) SALR 562 (CC).
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35(3)(h)."'' " Nel dealt with the procedural consequences of the
failure to testify when a legal duty to do so had been established.'55
Justice Ackermann held that "[t]he recalcitrant examinee who, on
refusing or failing to answer a question, triggers the possible
operation of the imprisonment provisions of section 189(1) [of the
Criminal Procedure Act] is not, in my view, an 'accused
person."" 56  Justice Ackermann described the imprisonment
provisions of Section 189 as "nothing more than process in aid."'57
Justice Sachs, however, distinguished Baloyi from Nel by
pointing out the punitive nature of Section 6 of the Prevention of
Family Violence Act, which provided for the imposition of a fine
or imprisonment for breach of the interdict provisions.' 8 Whereas
the examinees in Nel carried "the keys of their prison in their own
pockets,"' 59 no such situation existed with violators of the interdict
provisions of the Act.'60 Once the inquiry into the alleged violation
of the Act commences, the complainant essentially has abdicated
control of the proceedings to the state. 6' The Court concluded that
'54 Baloyi, 2000 (2) SALR at 438.
1-5 Id. at 439.
156 Nel, 1996 (3) SALR at 571.
157 Id. Section 189 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that:
If any person present at criminal proceedings is required to give evidence at
such proceedings and refuses to be sworn or to make an affirmation as a
witness, or, having been sworn or having made an affirmation as a witness,
refuses to answer any question put to him or refuses or fails to produce any
book, paper or document required to be produced by him, the court may in a
summary manner enquire into such refusal or failure and, unless the person so
refusing or failing has a just excuse for his refusal or failure, sentence him to
imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or, where the criminal
proceedings in question relate to an offence referred to in Part III of Schedule 2,
to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years.
Id. at 571 n.4.
158 Baloyi, 2000 (2) SALR at 439.
119 Nel, 1996 (3) SALR at 571.
160 Baloyi, 2000 (2) SALR at 439.
161 Id. In Justice Sach's summary:
[T]he objective is not to coerce the will to desist from on-going defiance, but to
punish the body for completed violation; and the convicted person carries no
keys in his pocket-indeed there is nothing in the Act to suggest that he can be
released early if either the complainant so wishes, or the judicial officer so
decides.
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the alleged violator of the interdict was an "accused person," and
therefore entitled to the presumptions of innocence. 162
The Court then went on to discuss whether Section 3(5) of the
Prevention of Family Violence Act imposed a reverse onus.'
6 3
Commenting on the "obscure" nature of the words used in Section
3 of the Family Violence Act and Section 170 of the Criminal
Procedure Act, Justice Sachs examined three possible
interpretations of the actions under review."6 They are summarized
in the judgment as interpretations A, B, and C.'65
Interpretation A, emphasizing the word "procedure," allowed
only the importation of the summary procedure, and not a reverse
onus.'66 In other words, the protections guaranteed in the Criminal
Procedure Act were not suspended; there was therefore no reverse
onus interfering with the presumption of innocence.'67 As the Court
pointed out, this interpretation lent itself to the approach mandated
in Section 39(2) of the Constitution: "[w]hen interpreting any
legislation... every court ... must promote the spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights."'68
Interpretation B embodied the High Court's position that
Section 170 "provides for a procedure which incorporates a
reverse onus as a central element. ,169
Interpretation C provided for a reverse onus, but only once the
"accused person" had proved lack of willfulness on his part.'70 The
Court articulated interpretation C as follows:
It presupposes that the judicial officer must first be
satisfied beyond reasonable doubts that the interdict has in
fact been breached and that only then is the onus placed on
the alleged violator to prove on a balance of probabilities a
lack of wilfulness on his part. There is a reverse onus, but
Id.
162 Id. at 440.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 441.
170 Id.
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its reach would be restricted because it would be triggered
only after a breach of the interdict has been proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.
71
Finding that interpretation C was too "strained,' ' 72 and not
persuaded by the High Court's position (interpretation B), the
Court adopted interpretation A as stating the correct legal
position.' 73 Distinguishing the substantive law question (what must
be proved) from the procedural law question (how to prove it),
Justice Sachs pointed out that Section 170(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Act provides for conviction for failure to attend court
proceedings "unless the accused satisfies the court that his failure
was not due to fault on his part."' 74 This shifting of the burden to
the accused renders the issue one of substantive law, and therefore,
the procedures of the Criminal Procedure Act are no longer
apposite. 5 In short, the presumption of innocence is left
undisturbed.
Justice Sachs referred to the need to provide the legislature
with latitude in dealing with intransigent social problems that find
their way to the courts. 176 He did, of course, recognize that while
such latitude exists within constitutionally appropriate limits,
fairness to the complainant is pre-eminent. 77 This requires that the
proceedings are "speedy and dispense with the normal process of
charge and plea,"'' 8 something akin to a bail hearing.
This judgment follows the Hugo decision in contextualizing
the contemporary reality of South African women. There is
widespread recognition that private violence against women is a
cause for great concern. Some would argue that such violence
constitutes a continual violation of women's human rights.'79 The
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 442.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
'71 See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, Domestic Violence as an International Human Rights
Issue, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 53, at 326.
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Court places its imprimatur on the need to eradicate such violence
without constraining the constitutional rights of the perpetrators.'8 °
The Court's decision is incontrovertible: there is a general,
societal consensus that private violence, indeed any violence,
against women is odious, and the state ought to deal with this
problem aggressively. 8' There is still a large gap, however,
between ubiquitous cultural attitudes about women, fueled by a
particular brand of South African masculinity that gives rise to
such violence, and the laudable statements of the Court. Closing
this gap will require a recognition that the structural and attitudinal
impediments to the "right to be free from private violence" as
articulated in the Constitution"2 can only be eradicated by a
combination of governmental assaults which include education,
access to resources, and continued vigilance regarding the extent
and persistence of violence. The Constitutional Court, at least, is
doing its part, but it needs to be bolstered by other institutional
arrangements that will include both legal and extra-legal measures.
V. Possibilities and Limitations in the Quest for
Gender Equality
The energies of women's organizations in South Africa have
historically been directed toward the eradication of apartheid. For
example, one of the most significant and widespread protests in
South Africa occurred in 1956 when approximately 20,000 women
marched in Pretoria to protest the pass law system.' 3 Most of the
major women's organizations have been adjuncts to the liberation
movements or operated with the specific purpose of opposing
apartheid. 4 The quest for racial equality dominated the political
and legal discourse prior to the constitutional negotiations.
The call for emphasis on women's rights or gender equality in
South Africa surfaced relatively late in the negotiations, but it was
presented to the delegates in an organized and persuasive manner.
180 Baloyi, 2000 (2) SALR at 434.
I Id. at 431-34.
182 S. AFR. CONST. ch. II, § 12(l)(c).
183 T. R. H. DAVENPORT, SOUTH AFRICA: A MODERN HISTORY 384 (1988). Until
1956 women had not been required to carry the passbooks dictated by the migrant labor
system. Id.
184 BERNSTEIN, supra note 27, at 81.
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The Women's National Coalition lobbied the major political
parties throughout the constitutional negotiations to address
women's issues and to commit to the principle of gender
equality.' 5 The Coalition persuaded the drafters of the new
Constitution that women's rights needed to be integrally linked to
national reconstruction.' 6 The Coalition also produced a Women's
Charter that set out a broad statement of principles about women's
rights.' 7 In a particularly successful strategy aimed at ensuring the
active participation of women in government and in constitution-
writing, women activists persuaded the African National Congress
to allocate one-third of its parliamentary list to women candidates
before the 1994 election.'88 South Africa now has several female
ministers and deputy ministers, and the Speaker of Parliament is a
woman. 189
The formal legal landscape appears very favorable for women.
As noted earlier, the Constitution embraces an impressive panoply
of rights to ensure that women benefit from the new constitutional
dispensation.'9 ° The enforcement mechanisms in the Constitution
will also further the goals of equality.'9 ' Most significantly, the
Constitutional Court in its judgments has aimed at substantive, as
opposed to formal, equality.
The South African government has also passed legislation to
give effect to the constitutional mandate of equality. For example,
the Domestic Violence Act was passed in 1998 and provides for
an aggressive approach to stemming private violence against
185 Catherine Albertyn, Women and the Transition to Democracy, in GENDER AND
THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 39, 51-57 (T. W. Bennett et al. eds., 1994). In
this article, the author assesses "the extent to which [the architects of the new order] took
account of the experiences, interests and demands of women in South Africa," and
concludes that women "succeeded in obtaining an equal commitment to race and gender
equality in the preamble and the constitutional principles." Id. at 39, 60-61.
186 See id. at 57, 60-61.
187 Id. at 52-53.
188 Danisa E. Baloyi, Apartheid and Identity: Black Women in South Africa, in
CONNECTING CROSS CULTURES AND CONTINENTS: BLACK WOMEN SPEAK OUT ON
IDENTITY, RACE, AND DEVELOPMENT 39, 43 (Achola 0. Pala ed., 1995).
189 Id.
190 S. AFR. CONST. ch. II.
M9' Id. at ch. II, § 38.
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women. 9 2 The Employment Equity Act was passed in 1998 to
ensure women's equal access to the workplace, ' 93 and the
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act was passed in 1998 to
prevent the continuing disadvantage that women in customary
unions encounter.194
Despite these impressive gains, however, the struggle for
gender equality will require constant attention and continued
vigilance. By initially abdicating the struggle for gender equality
in order to focus on racial equality, women may have
inadvertently relegated the struggle for women's rights to a
secondary place on the political agenda. The intersection of race
and gender in the lives of South African women, however, will
ensure that the issue of women's rights continues to move to the
center of political discourse and concern.
The alarming patterns of violence against women remain a
significant obstacle to women's equality. Although accurate
statistics are unavailable, both research and anecdotal evidence
suggest that violence against women in South Africa has reached
epidemic proportions.' 95 It has been estimated, for example, that
one in every four adult women is regularly assaulted by her
partner.'96 Sociologist Diana Russell estimates that 750,000 women
are raped every year in South Africa, "making South Africa's rape
incidence the highest in the world-double that of the U.S.A. One
in two South African women are raped in their lifetime, and the
rape rate for Black women is three times higher than it is for
whites."' 97 Arguably, violence against women has always been a
serious problem; the distortions of apartheid merely rendered such
violence either a private issue (with respect to domestic
violence)' 98 or one confined to black residential areas and therefore
'92 Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998, 3 BSRSA § 1 et seq. (2000).
193 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, 5 BSRSA § I et seq. (2000).
'94 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, 3 BSRSA § I et seq.
(2000).
'91 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN SOUTH AFRICA (1995).
196 Jenni Irish, Women and Political Violence, 16 AGENDA 7 (1993).
197 The War Against Women's Bodies, WEEKLY MAIL, Sept. 6-12, 1991, at 12
(describing Russell's estimates).
198 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 195, at 44-45, 47,
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of no concern to the police (in the case of rape).'99 The new
political atmosphere of transformation has resulted in greater
recognition of and exposure to the problem of violence against
women. 
200
Phenomenal resources will be required in order to overcome
the obstacles to gender equality in South Africa, namely, deeply
embedded patriarchal attitudes and widespread violence including
the violence of poverty as a legacy of colonialism and apartheid.
South African women have valuable human resources at their
disposal. The benefits to women of their engagement in the
struggle against apartheid are numerous. First, the concerns of
women are now being pursued in a society already amenable to
political change. For example, even though women's groups in
South Africa have existed largely to further the racial struggle,
women acquired tremendous organizational and political skills in
the process, skills that could now be harnessed to lobby for
women's rights. The wealth of women's skills is apparent, for the
organizational structures of the Mass Democratic Movement, trade
unions, civic organizations, and NGOs are replete with the input of
women activists. 26' Second, it is more difficult for the government
to ignore the demands of women. Notions of gender equity have
been incorporated in law and policy, which has in turn generated
an expectation of such gender equity. Third, women's needs are
easier to view as national because women are able to demonstrate
the connection between the situation of women and the situation of
South African people as a whole. For example, a program of land
redistribution has to recognize the role women play in the
agricultural sphere; so, too, achievement of access to housing
requires recognition of the large number of female-headed
households. Women's struggles revolve around very basic issues,
such as food, shelter, health, education, and physical security. The
more they focus on these issues, the more clearly South African
women activists can present themselves as participants in the
larger effort to rebuild South Africa.
199 Id. at 52, 93-94.
200 See generally id.
201 See generally NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
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South African women have been able to build on the
achievements of other women around the globe. The political
events in South Africa in the early 1990s occurred on the heels of
a well-orchestrated campaign by international feminists who
brought women's issues from the margins of political and legal
discourse to a place where women's concerns and priorities were
accorded formal international recognition. 2 While recognizing
vast economic, geographical, cultural, and social differences
between women in the developed world and their counterparts in
the developing world, feminist scholars and activists nevertheless
have suggested a collective mobilization of women against male
domination.
In the Western world, a groundswell of scholarship and
activism flowed from significant legal and policy successes toward
eradication of discrimination against women. In the last few
decades, feminist jurisprudence has made an important
contribution to the field of legal theory. It has succeeded in
transforming many areas of domestic law, forcing accommodation
of women's experiences. A cursory glance at the areas of criminal
law (particularly rape and domestic battery), family law, and anti-
discrimination law reveals the impact of feminist jurisprudence.
Although a male bias in the law persists, the situation of certain
women has improved dramatically in the past few decades, and
this change is a direct result of feminist law reform efforts.
South African women activists were in the happy position of
taking advantage of both the achievements of global feminist
agitation and the recognition of the limitations of some of their
work. In the 1990s, when delegates to South Africa's
constitutional negotiations fought over the details of the rights to
be included in the new Constitution, women activists within South
Africa had already managed to organize and successfully influence
the process. They armed themselves with evidence of the
importance of formalizing protection for women.
VI. Conclusion
In just under a decade, South Africans have made remarkable
202 See generally Rebecca J. Cook, Women's International Human Rights Law: The
Way Forward, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 53, at 3.
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steps towards the eradication of racial discrimination. Efforts to
sweep away the vestiges of gender discrimination have also been
impressive. Whereas ten years ago one could argue that the
eradication of racial discrimination was paramount, the
contemporary reality reflects that argument to be rather short-
sighted, both politically and legally. The purpose of the movement
from apartheid to democracy requires that attention be paid to all
forms of discrimination, wherever they occur and whomever they
affect. This is a difficult process that requires continued vigilance.
As this article has shown, apartheid had a particularly pernicious
effect on women and has left a legacy that will require Herculean
efforts to overcome. The South African government, through its
expansive Constitution, Bill of Rights, and enabling legislation,
has placed the country on firm footing for overcoming that legacy.
